



AFDI Overview

Governing Regulations/Directives, if Applicable: PMGM Thrust #1 directs for programs to plan to support interoperability to the COP, Joint Vision 2010, Joint Planning Doctrine (JPD) Series 2.xx, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, JPD 6.0, C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.

Project Description: AFDI will provide an SCI Certifiable DII COE compliant heterogeneous (UNIX/NT) architecture for transitioning the CSE-SS SCI DoDIIS Intelligence infrastructure to a pure SCI Certifiable DII COE infrastructure as mandated by the above documents. AFDI will provide automated system and network management, while providing secure data access to both CSE-SS and DII COE compliant Intelligence Mission Applications. Access will be achieved through a heterogeneous, browser based, Web enabled, site configurable, network infrastructure. AFDI will allow network wide system administration and location independent unitary logon through employment of Public Key Encryption (PKI) techniques for UNIX and/or NT workstations. The installation of these segmented CSE-SS and DII COE compliant components will be automated with the ability to select certain functionality for installation or de-installation if a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) product is available. AFDI will provide support for over 20,000 workstations and servers installed at over 160 sites including all of the Unified Commands and Numbered Air Forces

Customers: Users of the network and system administration of the Intelligence Community's Security Infrastructure for IMAs at all bases, sites, organizations, and units includes all Unified Command headquarters and other DOD and government agencies.

Requirement Documents: DCID 6/3, DII COE I&RTS, DII COE Security SRS, DII COE Administration SRS, DII COE Network SRS.

Justification: The IPDM instructions require complete functional decomposition by NLT FY2001 and Level 7 segmentation compliance of a selected number of National IMAs NLT FY2002 with input to the Common Operational Picture (COP) during this same timeline. In order to meet this key date the Air Force's IMAs and Site Unique applications must be Level 5 compliant in preparation for the initial migration/transition to an SCI Certifiable DII COE Version release. The Air Force has Site Unique applications that exist throughout the Air Force and the Unified Commands. These applications must be segmented and configuration definitions built to test the performance of these segments in a test environment prior to operational implementation in the support of the "Warfighter". Furthermore, the Air Force and Unified Commands must have migrated to the Solaris and NT operating systems IAW the DoDIIS Instructions or they will not be supported.

Implementation of AFDI contains a clear migration path from DII COE level 5 to Level 7 compliance. Currently, migratory paths and associated funding include segmentation of both the data and the application of the data. Implementing AFDI in this fashion

precludes the need to focus scarce future resources on both the data and the application by allowing the concentration of those same resources exclusively on the application or presentation of the data.

Deliverables: The AFDI deliverables will be a software release that has undergone software development and problem resolution, configuration management, complete cycle of testing, current technology infusion (PKI, etc), Help Desk support, a complete set of documentation and installation and transition assistance for the users.

Dependencies/Relationships: The sites must have a computer network with associated hardware that supports the Solaris and/or Microsoft NT/2000 operating systems on which AFDI will be installed.

Impacts: The AF IDHS will not be DII COE compliant at the appropriate level within the designated deadlines. Migration and transition of site unique applications providing operational data to the COP and the “warfighter” will degrade and become unusable. Air Force and Unified Commands risk losing current capabilities for processing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence data at the National level due to incompatibilities. Furthermore, future funding for IDHS efforts would be at risk since programs would not be compliant with current guidelines. Additional cost and a manning burden of having to support two distinct and separate networks due to non-segmentation of applications. Also, systems will have to be re-evaluated or may even be canceled due to a non-supported architecture.

AF DoDIIS CSE-SS sites do not have a transition architecture for migrating from the current SCI Certifiable CSE-SS infrastructure to a (TBD) SCI Certifiable DII COE compliant infrastructure. DISA, the OPR for DII COE, will not produce an SCI Certifiable version of the DII COE for the DoDIIS Intelligence Community. Therefore, the sites are left with an aging, stagnant (CSE-SS has been in a maintenance mode for over two years) architecture while the Intelligence Mission Application (IMA) PMs and developers produce and field IMAs infused with advanced technology. This stagnant infrastructure and technologically advanced IMAs cannot remain compatible in the near future. Thus, the IMAs will be forced to forego the infusion of advanced technology because the infrastructure will not support it. Without AFDI, the sites will be forced to maintain two separate and distinct networks (CSE-SS and DII COE based). The maintenance of these two networks will strain already over tasked system administrators, require extensive training, and will require manual destructive software reloads of existing systems Air Force wide. A single manual DII COE workstation installation or reload can exceed two workdays.